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1Secure Transmission via Joint Precoding
Optimization for Downlink MISO NOMA
Nan Zhao, Senior Member, IEEE, Dongdong Li, Mingqian Liu, Member, IEEE, Yang Cao, Yunfei Chen, Senior
Member, IEEE, Zhiguo Ding, Senior Member, IEEE, Xianbin Wang, Fellow, IEEE,
Abstract—Non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) is a
prospective technology for radio resource constrained future
mobile networks. However, NOMA users far from base station
(BS) tend to be more susceptible to eavesdropping because
they are allocated more transmit power. In this paper, we aim
to jointly optimize the precoding vectors at BS to ensure the
legitimate security in a downlink multiple-input single-output
(MISO) NOMA network. When the eavesdropping channel state
information (CSI) is available at BS, we can maximize the sum
secrecy rate by joint precoding optimization. Owing to its non-
convexity, the problem is converted into a convex one, which
is solved by a second-order cone programming based iterative
algorithm. When the CSI of the eavesdropping channel is not
available, we first consider the case that the secure user is not
the farthest from BS, and the transmit power of the farther
users is maximized via joint precoding optimization to guarantee
its security. Then, we consider the case when the farthest user
from BS requires secure transmission, and the modified successive
interference cancellation order and joint precoding optimization
can be adopted to ensure its security. Similar method can be
exploited to solve the two non-convex problems when the CSI
is unknown. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed
schemes can improve the security performance for MISO NOMA
systems effectively, with and without eavesdropping CSI.
Index Terms—Joint precoding optimization, NOMA, secure
transmission, successive interference cancellation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) is a prospective
technology for the future resource-constrained mobile net-
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works by offering high transmission rate, spectrum efficiency
and user density [2], [3]. NOMA can be mainly classified
into power-domain and code-domain [4]. In this paper, we
focus on the power-domain NOMA [5], which does not require
complex encoding or decoding schemes to achieve the desired
requirements. In the power-domain NOMA, transmit power
is allocated according to the channel strengths of users, i.e.,
the user with a weaker channel will be allocated with higher
transmit power. Then, successive interference cancellation
(SIC) is utilized at each receiver to extract the signals from
the users with higher transmit power to recover its own.
Owing to the superior nature of NOMA [4], a lot of
significant progresses have been made recently on its design
and implementation, including capacity analysis [6], power
allocation [7], fairness between users [8], user pairing [9], and
performance analysis [10]. In addition, NOMA can also be
integrated with other existing communication technologies to
achieve better performance [11], e.g., multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) [12], multiple-input single-output (MISO)
[13], cooperative communications [14], cognitive radio [15],
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) aided communications [16],
[17], multiuser diversity [18], etc. In particular, for the MISO-
NOMA networks, Hanif et al. did some fundamental work
in [19] to maximize the downlink sum rate via joint precod-
ing optimization with a minorization-maximization algorithm.
However, these works did not consider the privacy among
users and secure transmission.
The security vulnerability of wireless networks, especially
the weakness from adversarial eavesdropping, always remains
a challenge, due to the open nature of wireless medium [20],
[21]. Different from the conventional encryption, physical
layer security has been widely studied to enhance the security
in recent years, through physical-layer adaptive transmission
and physical link attributes based authentication [22]. Some
initial information theoretic work on physical layer security
was done by Wyner in [23], following which many recent
works have been conducted to mitigate the eavesdropping
by using different techniques, such as artificial noise (AN)
or jamming [24]–[26], joint beamforming [27], relaying [28],
[29], interference management [30], [31], etc. In addition, the
security performance such as secrecy outage probability has
also been analyzed in existing research works [32].
In NOMA networks, achieving secure transmission is also a
great challenge due to the specific requirement on the transmis-
sion power among the paired NOMA users. To make the SIC
of NOMA achievable, the users that are far from the BS should
be allocated higher transmit power. This will dramatically
2increase the chance of being intercepted by the adversarial
eavesdropper. In addition, SIC decodes the signals from all
the far users, and the privacy between NOMA users may
not be guaranteed. Thus, the weak-channel user with higher
transmit power is more vulnerable to eavesdropping attack.
To solve these problems, several works have been conducted.
In [33], Ding et al. exploited beamforming and power allo-
cation to improve the security performance for NOMA based
multicast-unicast transmission. The optimal power allocation,
SIC order and transmission rate were demonstrated by He et
al. in [34] to guarantee the security for NOMA networks.
In [35], Chen et al. analyzed the secrecy performance for
cooperative NOMA networks. In [36], Xu et al. proposed a
security-aware resource allocation scheme considering delay
constraint in NOMA-based cognitive radio networks. Cao et
al. proposed to protect the privacy of MISO-NOMA networks
via beamforming optimization in [37]. AN can also be utilized
to guarantee the security performance for NOMA systems. In
[38], Lv et al. proposed a secrecy beamforming scheme to
exploit AN to achieve secure NOMA transmission. Zhou et al.
adopted AN in [39] to perform secure simultaneous wireless
information and power transfer for MISO-NOMA networks. In
[40], Zhao et al. jointly optimized beamforming and jamming
to disrupt the eavesdropping for MISO-NOMA networks.
Different from the above-mentioned research, we aim to
guarantee the secure transmission for downlink MISO-NOMA
networks via joint precoding optimization in this paper. By
changing the signal strength of some specific users, the eaves-
dropping can be effectively disrupted, in both cases with and
without the eavesdropping channel state information (CSI)
at BS. The SIC order is also different from that of the
conventional NOMA scheme when the farthest user from BS
requires secure transmission without eavesdropping CSI. The
key contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
 To achieve SIC in NOMA, the users with weaker channel
gains are allocated higher transmit power, which increases
the risk of adversarial eavesdropping. In addressing this
issue, we propose to leverage joint precoding optimiza-
tion to guarantee the secure transmission for downlink
MISO-NOMA networks, in the cases with or without
eavesdropping CSI, respectively.
 For the case when the eavesdropping CSI is available
at BS, the precoding vectors are jointly optimized to
maximize the sum secrecy rate. Since the optimization
is non-convex, we transform it into a convex one via the
second-order cone (SOC) programming. Thus, the subop-
timal solution to the original problem can be effectively
calculated by solving this convex-problem iteratively.
 When the eavesdropping CSI is unavailable, we first
consider that the secure user is not the farthest one from
BS. We can maximize the transmit power of the farther
users via joint precoding optimization to guarantee its
own security. When the farthest user from BS requires
secure transmission, the modified SIC order and joint
precoding optimization can be leveraged to ensure its
security. Similar method to the scheme with CSI can be
adopted to solve these two non-convex problems.
Fig. 1. A downlink MISO-NOMA network with a potential eavesdropper.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
the considered system model in this paper is presented. The
secure transmission scheme for MISO-NOMA networks with
eavesdropping CSI is proposed in Section III. In Section IV,
the secure transmission schemes without eavesdropping CSI
are proposed when the secure user is or is not the farthest
one from BS, respectively. In Section V, simulation results are
presented to show the effectiveness of the schemes. Finally,
the conclusion is drawn in Section VI.
Notation: I denotes the identity matrix. 0 represents the zero
matrix. Ay is the Hermitian transpose of matrix A. kak is
the Euclidean norm of vector a. CN (a;A) is the complex
Gaussian distribution with mean a and covariance matrix A.
Re() defines the real operator.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a system where a M -antenna BS transmits in-
formation to K single-antenna users via NOMA as shown
in Fig. 1. There is a single-antenna eavesdropper aiming at
intercepting the legitimate information. We define UE-i as the
ith user, i 2 K , f1; 2;    ;Kg. The received signal at UE-i
can be expressed as
byi = hi KX
j=1
wjxj + ni; i 2 K; (1)
where wj 2 CM1 is defined as the precoding vector for UE-
j, xj is the transmitted information for UE-j with Efkxjk2g =
1, and ni  CN
 
0; 2

is the additive white Gaussian noise.
The MISO channel vector from the BS to UE-i can be written
as
hi =
q
d i gi 2 C1M ; i 2 K; (2)
which is subject to block Rayleigh fading. di is the distance
between the BS and UE-i.  is the path-loss exponent and  is
the channel gain at the unit distance. gi  CN (0; I) represents
the normalized Rayleigh fading vector.
Assume that UE-1 is the farthest user from the BS with the
weakest channel, and it can decode its own information by
treating the interference from other users as noise. UE-K is
3the nearest user with the strongest channel. It can remove the
signals of all the other users according to SIC, to recover its
own information. Other users are arranged according to their
distances from the BS. According to the above requirements,
the following conditions should be satisfied for the conven-
tional NOMA as
jhiw1j2  jhiw2j2     jhiwK 1j2  jhiwK j2; 8i 2 K: (3)
According to (3), we define R[i]t as the transmission rate of
UE-i, which can be expressed as
R
[i]
t = log2
0BBB@1 + jhiwij2KP
j=i+1
jhiwj j2 + 2
1CCCA; i = 1;    ;K 1:(4)
When i = K, its transmission rate is
R
[K]
t = log2
 
1 + jhKwK j2=2

: (5)
Furthermore, the achievable rate at UE-k to decode the
signal for UE-i, i < k, can be expressed as
Rik = log2
0BBB@1 + jhkwij2KP
j=i+1
jhkwj j2 + 2
1CCCA; i = 1;    ;K   1: (6)
To make NOMA feasible, we should guarantee that the
signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at UE-k to de-
code the signal of UE-i should be no less than the SINR at
UE-i to decode its own signal, and we have
min

Rii+1; R
i
i+2; : : : ; R
i
K
	  R[i]t ;8i = 1;    ;K   1: (7)
In conventional MISO-NOMA networks, the sum rate of
users should be maximized as
max
wi
X
i2K
R
[i]
t
s:t: jhiw1j2  jhiw2j2     jhiwK j2; i 2 K;
KX
i=1
kwik2  Ps;
min

Rii+1; : : : ; R
i
K
	  R[i]t  rt; i = 1;  ;K   1;
R
[K]
t  rt;
(8)
where Ps is the limitation of BS transmit power and rt is the
rate requirement for each user.
However, the security of users, especially the farther users
with higher transmit power, will be threatened by eavesdrop-
ping. The eavesdropping rate towards UE-i can be written as
R[i]e = log2
0BBB@1 + jhewij2KP
j=1;j 6=i
jhewj j2 + 2
1CCCA ; i 2 K; (9)
where he is the MISO channel vector from the BS to eaves-
dropper. Thus, the secrecy rate of UE-i can be expressed as
R[i]s =
h
R
[i]
t  R[i]e
i+
; i 2 K: (10)
where []+ means that when R[i]t < R[i]e , R[i]s equals zero.
Therefore, joint precoding optimization will be leveraged
to develop three schemes based on different scenarios, with or
without eavesdropping CSI.
III. SECURE TRANSMISSION SCHEME WITH
EAVESDROPPING CSI
In this section, we assume that the eavesdropping CSI is
available at the BS1, and propose Scheme I in order to max-
imize the sum secrecy rate via joint precoding optimization
when all the users require secure transmission. When only
some of the users require secure transmission, the correspond-
ing problem can be solved similarly.
A. Problem Formulation of Scheme I
The joint precoding optimization problem of Scheme I can
be formulated as
max
wi
X
i2K
R[i]s
s:t: jhiw1j2  jhiw2j2     jhiwK j2; i 2 K;
KX
i=1
kwik2  Ps;
min

Rii+1; : : : ; R
i
K
	  R[i]t  rt; i = 1;  ;K   1;
R
[K]
t  rt;
(11)
in which the sum secrecy rate can be maximized. Notice that
the objective function and most of the constraints are non-
convex in (11), which will be approximately transformed into
a convex one in the next subsection.
B. Approximate Transformations
To calculate the solutions to the non-convex problem in (11)
effectively, we should transform it using necessary approxima-
tions. First, we have
jhiwj j2 = hiwjwyjhyi : (12)
This gives the sum secrecy rate as (13) at the top of the next
page. Thus, (11) can be transformed into
max
wi
K 1X
i=1
log2
 PK
j=i hiwjw
y
jh
y
i + 
2PK
j=i+1 hiwjw
y
jh
y
i + 
2
!
+ log2
 
hKwKwyKh
y
K + 
2
2
!
 
KX
i=1
log2
 PK
j=1 hewjw
y
jh
y
e + 
2PK
j=1;j 6=i hewjw
y
jh
y
e + 
2
!
s:t: jhiw1j2  jhiw2j2     jhiwK j2; i 2 K;
KX
i=1
kwik2  Ps;
min

Rii+1; : : : ; R
i
K
	  R[i]t  rt; i = 1;    ;K   1;
R
[K]
t  rt:
(14)
1In this scenario, the eavesdropper can act as a registered user of the
network, without the authorization to access the confidential information of
other legitimate users. In addition, the eavesdropper cannot obtain enough
information to perform SIC towards the legitimate users.
4KX
i=1
R[i]s =
K 1X
i=1
26664log2
0BBB@1+ jhiwij2KP
j=i+1
jhiwj j2+2
1CCCA log2
0BBB@1+ jhewij2KP
j=1;j 6=i
jhevj j2+2
1CCCA
37775+
26664log2

1+
jhKwK j2
2

 log2
0BBB@1+ jhewK j2K 1P
j=1
jhewj j2 + 2
1CCCA
37775
=
K 1X
i=1
"
log2
 PK
j=i hiwjw
y
jh
y
i + 
2PK
j=i+1 hiwjw
y
jh
y
i + 
2
!
  log2
 PK
j=1 hewjw
y
jh
y
e + 
2PK
j=1;j 6=i hewjw
y
jh
y
e + 
2
!#
+
"
log2
 
hKwKwyKh
y
K + 
2
2
!
  log2
 PK
j=1 hewjw
y
jh
y
e + 
2PK 1
j=1 hewjw
y
jh
y
e + 
2
!#
:
(13)
Using auxiliary variables ai, bi, zK , ci and di, we can derive
the upper and lower bounds for (14) as
KX
j=i
hiwjwyjh
y
i + 
2  eai ; i = 1; 2;    ;K   1; (15)
KX
j=i+1
hiwjwyjh
y
i + 
2  ebi ; i = 1; 2;    ;K   1; (16)
hKwKwyKh
y
K + 
2  ezK ; (17)
KX
j=1
hewjwyjh
y
e + 
2  eci ; i 2 K; (18)
KX
j=1;j 6=i
hewjwyjh
y
e + 
2  edi ; i 2 K: (19)
According to (15)-(19), we have
KX
i=1
R[i]s
 log2
K 1Y
i=1
eai   log2
K 1Y
i=1
ebi + log2 e
zK   log2 2
  log2
KY
i=1
eci + log2
KY
i=1
edi
= log2 e
PK 1
i=1 (ai bi)+
PK
i=1(di ci)+zK   2  log2 
=
"
K 1X
i=1
(ai   bi) +
KX
i=1
(di   ci) + zK
#
 log2 e  2  log2 :
(20)
Subsequently, (14) can be transformed as
max
ai;bi;zK ;ci;di;wi
K 1X
i=1
(ai   bi) +
KX
i=1
(di   ci) + zK
s:t:
XK
j=i
hiwjwyjh
y
i+
2eai ; i=1;   ;K 1;XK
j=i+1
hiwjwyjh
y
i+
2ebi ; i=1;   ;K 1;XK
j=1
hewjwyjh
y
e + 
2  eci ; i 2 K;XK
j=1;j 6=ihewjw
y
jh
y
e + 
2  edi ; i 2 K;
hKwKwyKh
y
K + 
2  ezK ;XK
i=1
kwik2  Ps;
jhiw1j2  jhiw2j2     jhiwK j2; i 2 K;
min

Rii+1; : : : ; R
i
K
	  R[i]t  rt; i = 1;    ;K 1;
R
[K]
t  rt:
(21)
Although the objective function in (21)
PK 1
i=1 (ai   bi) +PK
i=1 (di   ci) + zK is convex, some constraints are still
non-convex. Based on the Taylor’s expansion, the first-order
expansion at bi and ci can be given by T1 = ebi(bi   bi + 1)
and T2 = eci(ci   ci + 1), respectively. Thus, (16) and (18)
can be changed into
KX
j=i+1
hiwjwyjh
y
i + 
2  ebi(bi   bi + 1); i = 1;  ;K 1;(22)
KX
j=1
hewjwyjh
y
e + 
2  eci(ci   ci + 1); i = 1;    ;K: (23)
Based on the SOC constraint, we have
2   (  0;   0) =) k[2;   ]yk  + : (24)
Thus, (22) and (23) can be rewritten as[2hiwi+1;  ;2hiwK ;2;T1 1]yT1+1; i=1;  ;K 1; (25)[2hew1;    ; 2hewK ; 2; T2   1]y  T2 + 1; i 2 K: (26)
In addition, the left sides of (15), (17) and (19) are quadratic
functions. We define
Fij(wj) = jhiwj j2: (27)
5Then, the first order Taylor’s approximation (27) can be
expressed as
Tij(wj ;wj) = 2Re

wyjh
y
ihiwj

 Re

wyjh
y
ihiwj

: (28)
Using this method, the inequalities (15), (17) and (19) can be
transformed as (29) at the top of the next page.
For the decoding order of users, it equals
Ci=
8>><>>:
jhiwK j2  min
jhiwK 1j2; : : : ; jhiw1j2	;
jhiwK 1j2  min
jhiwK 2j2; : : : ; jhiw1j2	;
: : : ;
jhiw2j2  jhiw1j2:
(30)
The right sides of these inequalities in (30) are quadratic
functions of variables wi. Thus, we can also use the same
method to linearize them. Using (27) and (28), the order
constraint (30) can be transformed as
eCi =
8>><>>:
jhiwK j2  minj2[1;K 1] Tij (wj ;wj) ;
jhiwK 1j2  minj2[1;K 2] Tij (wj ;wj) ;
: : : ;
jhiw2j2  T11 (w1;w1) :
(31)
In order to guarantee the quality of transmission and make
all the rates in (6) achievable, we also need to constrain and
transform the transmission rate of legitimate users and the
condition of (7) according to the following proposition.
Proposition 1: R[i]t  rt and (7) can be transformed as
si  2rt ; i 2 K; (56); (57): (32a)
Oi; i=1;    ;K 1; (63): (32b)
Proof: Refer to Appendix A.
Therefore, according to the above derivation, the original
problem can be transformed into a convex one in (33) at the top
of the next page, which can be solved using existing toolboxes
such as CVX.
C. Iterative Algorithm
With all above transformations, (11) can be solved via
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Iterative Algorithm for (11)
1: Set the maximum number of iterations T and randomly
generate (wi; ai; bi; zK ; ci; di) for (33).
2: Repeat
3: Using CVX to calculate the solutions to (33) as
(wi ; ai ; bi ; zK ; ci ; di ).
4: Update (wi; ai; bi; zK ; ci; di) = (wi ; ai ; bi ; zK ; ci ; di )
5: t = t+ 1.
6: Until t = T .
7: Output wi ; i 2 K.
Remark: In each iteration, the value of the sum secrecy rate
will be no less than the value in the previous iteration, which
indicates that the secrecy rate will monotonically increase or
non-decrease as iterations proceed. Furthermore, due to the
transmit power constraint at BS, there also exists an upper
bound of sum rate. Therefore, we conclude that Algorithm 1
is guaranteed to be convergent.
D. Computational Complexity Analysis
We solve an SOC program in every iteration of Algorithm
1 for Scheme I, and utilize the computational complexity of
the SOCP in (33) to estimate the computational complexity
[41]. The total number of constraints in the formulations of
(33) is 1:5K2+4:5K. The iteration number needed to reduce
the duality gap to a small constant, which is upper bounded
by O(p1:5K2 + 4:5K). Then, we calculate the upper bound
8K2+(M+1)K 1 in order to represent the sum dimensions
of all SOCs in (33). The amount of work per iteration is
O((0:5K2 + 5:5K   1)2(8K2 + MK + K   1)) by the
interior-point method. Therefore, the worst-case complexity
of the SOCP in (33) can be estimated as O((0:5K2+5:5K 
1)2(8K2 +MK +K   1)(p1:5K2 + 4:5K)).
IV. SECURE TRANSMISSION SCHEME WITHOUT
EAVESDROPPING CSI
The secrecy rate of some specific users in the network will
be guaranteed by the modified SIC order and joint precoding
optimization in this section, when the eavesdropping CSI is
not available at the BS.
A. Scheme II: UE-k is the Secure User, 2kK
We first consider that the secure user is not the farthest
one from BS, i.e., UE-k aims to perform secure transmission,
where 2  k  K. To improve the security of UE-k, we
can maximize the transmit power of the users whose distance
from BS is larger than that of UE-k. Thus, the confidential
information can be hidden in the larger signals of these users,
and its security can be enhanced. The optimization problem
can be presented as
max
wi
k 1X
i=1
jwij2
s:t: jhiw1j2  jhiw2j2     jhiwK j2; i 2 K;
KX
i=1
kwik2  Ps;
min

Rii+1; : : : ; R
i
K
	  R[i]t  rt; i = 1;    ;K   1;
R
[K]
t  rt:
(34)
In this case, the eavesdropping rate towards UE-k can be
given by
R[k]e = log2
0BBB@1 + jhewkj2k 1P
i=1
jhewij2 +
KP
j=k+1
jhewj j2 + 2
1CCCA: (35)
We can observe that the denominator of (35) includesPk 1
i=1 jhewij2, which is maximized by (34) to disrupt the
eavesdropping toward UE-k. Thus, the secure transmission of
UE-k can be guaranteed.
Duo to the non-convexity of (34), we should change it into
a convex one based on the SOC and some transformations.
Specifically, the transformation of SIC order is the same as
the inequalities in (30) and (31). The transformation of the
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lower limitation of transmission rate in (34) is the same as
that in Proposition 1. Thus, we can convert (34) into a convex
one as
max
wi
k 1X
i=1
jwij2
s:t:
KX
i=1
kwik2  Ps;
eCi; i 2 K;
si  2rt ; i 2 K; (56); (57);
Oi; i=1;    ;K 1; (63);
(36)
which can be easily solved by existing toolboxes such as CVX.
Therefore, the solution to (34) can be calculated by solving
(36) iteratively, according to Algorithm 1.
B. Scheme III: UE-1 is the Secure User
In this subsection, we consider the scenario when the
farthest user UE-1 from the BS requires secure transmission.
In this case, the transmit power allocated to UE-1 will be
highest according to conventional NOMA, and it will be
severely threatened by eavesdropping. To guarantee the secure
transmission of UE-1, its signal should be hidden in the signals
of other users by maximizing the transmit power of UE-2, with
the SIC order at each receiver modified as
jhiw2j2  jhiw1j2  jhiw3j2     jhiwK j2; 8i 2 K: (37)
For UE-2, it decodes its own information directly , and its
SINR is expressed as
SINR22 =
jh2w2j2
KP
j=1;j 6=2
jh2wj j2 + 2
:
(38)
For UE-1, it first removes the signal for UE-2 and then
decodes its own signal with SINR denoted as
SINR11 =
jh1w1j2
KP
j=3
jh1wj j2 + 2
:
(39)
For UE-i, 3 iK, it extracts the signals of farther users
from the BS, and then decodes its own signal with the SINR
expressed as
SINRii =
jhiwij2
KP
j=i+1
jhiwj j2 + 2
; i = 3; 4;    ;K   1;
(40)
7SINRKK =
jhKwK j2
2
: (41)
Thus, the optimization problem to guarantee the security of
the farthest UE-1 can be written as
max
wi
jw2j2
s:t: jhiw2j2  jhiw1j2  jhiw3j2     jhiwK j2; i 2 K;
KX
i=1
kwik2  Ps;
min

R21; R
2
3; : : : ; R
2
K
	  R[2]t  rt;
min

R13; R
1
4; : : : ; R
1
K
	  R[1]t  rt;
min

Rii+1; : : : ; R
i
K
	  R[i]t  rt; i = 3;    ;K   1;
R
[K]
t  rt:
(42)
In Scheme III, the eavesdropping rate towards UE-1 can be
expressed as
R[1]e = log2
0BB@1 + jhew1j2
jhew2j2+
KP
i=3
jhewij2 + 2
1CCA : (43)
We can observe that the denominator of (43) includes jhew2j2,
which is maximized by (42) to disrupt the eavesdropping
toward UE-1. Thus, the secure transmission of UE-1 can be
guaranteed.
Owing to the non-convexity of (42), we should approximate-
ly transform it into a convex one. The modified SIC order for
users is
Qi=
8>><>>:
jhiwK j2  min
jhiwK 1j2; : : : ; jhiw1j2; jhiw2j2	;
jhiwK 1j2  min
jhiwK 2j2;: : :; jhiw1j2; jhiw2j2	;
: : : ;
jhiw1j2  jhiw2j2:
(44)
According to (27) and (28), the constraint (44) can be trans-
formed as
eQi =
8>><>>:
jhiwK j2  minj2[1;K 1] Tij (wj ;wj) ;
jhiwK 1j2  minj2[1;K 2] Tij (wj ;wj) ;
: : : ;
jhiw1j2  Ti2 (w2;w2) :
(45)
For UE-3 to UE-K, a method similar to that in Appendix
A can be utilized to transform the lower limitation of trans-
mission rate and make the rate achievable in (42).
On the other hand, for UE-1 and UE-2, we need a different
derivation due to the modified SIC order.
First, variables es1 and es2 can be introduced, and we have
fLi=2Re

wyih
y
ihiwi

esi   1  
Re

wyih
y
ihiwi

(esi   1)2 (esi 1); i=1; 2;(46a)h2h1w3; 2h1w4;   ; 2h1wK ; 2;fL1 1iy  fL1 + 1;(46b)h2h2w1; 2h2w3;   ; 2h2wK ; 2;fL2 1iy  fL2 + 1:(46c)
Then, we should also introduce variables efi, egi, ehi and eqi
to obtain the upper and lower bounds as
KX
j=1
hiwjwyjh
y
i + 
2  eefi ; i = 1; 3; 4;    ;K; (47a)
KX
j=1;j 6=2
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h2wjwyjh
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2 + 
2  e eq2 ; (47d)
and thus the inequality in (42) min

R21; R
2
3; : : : ; R
2
K
	  R[2]t
can be transformed asefi   egi +fh2   eq2  0; i = 1; 3; 4;    ;K: (48)
In addition, we introduce bfi, bgi, bhi and bqi to obtain
KX
j=1;j 6=2
hiwjwyjh
y
i+
2  ebfi ; i = 3; 4    ;K; (49a)
KX
j=3
hiwjwyjh
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i+
2  ebgi ; i = 3; 4    ;K; (49b)
KX
j=1;j 6=2
h1wjwyjh
y
1 + 
2  ech1 ; (49c)
KX
j=3
h1wjwyjh
y
1 + 
2  e bq1 ; (49d)
and thus the inequality in (42) min

R13; R
1
4; : : : ; R
1
K
	  R[1]t
is equivalent tobfi   bgi +ch1   bq1  0; i = 3; 4    ;K: (50)
According to above derivations, the optimization problem
(42) can be transformed as
max
wi
jw2j2
s:t:
X
i2K
kwik2  Ps;
eQi; i 2 K;
si  2rt ; i = 3; 4;    ;K; (56); (57);esi  2rt ; i = 1; 2; (46);
Oi; i=3; 4;   ;K 1; (63); (47); (48); (49); (50):
(51)
which is convex, and can be solved by existing toolboxes such
as CVX. Therefore, the solution to (42) can be calculated by
solving (51) iteratively, according to Algorithm 1.
C. Multiple Secure Users
In the above two schemes, we aim to guarantee the security
of a single secure user. If we want to ensure the secure
transmission of multiple users simultaneously, it can be solved
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Fig. 2. Convergence of the sum secrecy rate for Scheme I with different
values of transmit power Ps. M = 3, rt = 1 bit/s/Hz, de = 200 m.
in a similar way. For example, we assume that UE-1 and UE-4
are secure users. The optimization problem can be written as
max
wi
3X
i=2
jwij2
s:t: jhiw2j2  jhiw1j2     jhiwK j2; i 2 K;
KX
i=1
kwik2  Ps;
min

R21; R
2
3; : : : ; R
2
K
	  R[2]t  rt;
min

R13; R
1
4; : : : ; R
1
K
	  R[1]t  rt;
min

Rii+1; : : : ; R
i
K
	  R[i]t  rt; i = 3;    ;K   1;
R
[K]
t rt;
(52)
which can be solved similarly according to Section IV-B.
In the extreme case when all the users require secure
transmission, we should exploit other methods to guarantee
the legitimate security, such as AN in [40].
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Simulation results are presented to evaluate the performance
of the proposed joint precoding optimization schemes for
MISO-NOMA networks in this section. Consider a MISO-
NOMA network with 3 users and an eavesdropper, in which
UE-1, UE-2 and UE-3 are 450 m, 250 m and 50 m from the
BS, respectively. We set  = 2:6,  = 10 4 and 2 = 10 11
mW.
First, the performance of Scheme I is analyzed. The con-
vergence of the sum secrecy rate for Scheme I with different
values of transmit power Ps is shown in Fig. 2, when M = 3,
rt = 1 bit/s/Hz. The distance between the BS and the
eavesdropper de = 200 m. From the results, we can see
that Algorithm 1 for Scheme I converges after about only
10 iterations, for different transmit power. In addition, the
sum secrecy rate of the legitimate network increases from 15
bit/s/Hz to 21.4 bit/s/Hz when the sum transmit power ranges
from 10 mW to 100 mW.
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We compare the sum secrecy rate of Scheme I under
different Ps, M and de in Fig. 3. rt = 1 bit/s/Hz. From the
results, we can observe that the sum secrecy rate of Scheme
I increases with M and Ps, which means that larger M
and higher Ps can improve the security performance of the
legitimate network. In addition, although the sum secrecy rate
is a little higher when de is larger, the improvement is marginal
to be ignored. This indicates that Scheme I can ensure reliable
security even when the eavesdropper is located near the BS.
The sum secrecy rate, sum transmission rate and sum
eavesdropping rate of Scheme I and the conventional scheme
in (8) are compared in Fig. 4. M = 3, rt = 1 bit/s/Hz and
de = 50 m. From the results, we can notice that although the
sum transmission rate of Scheme in (8) is higher than that
of the proposed Scheme I, the sum secrecy rate of Scheme
I is higher. This is because the sum eavesdropping rate can
be effectively decreased by Scheme I, as shown in the figure.
Thus, the security performance of the MISO-NOMA network
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Fig. 5. Sum secrecy rate comparison of Scheme I and the OMA Scheme
with different Ps and M . rt = 1 bit/s/Hz and de = 300 m.
can be effectively guaranteed by Scheme I, especially for
the farthest UE-1. In addition, the proportional relationship
between the transmit power of each user is almost unchanged
when Ps is high, which also results in the almost unchanged
eavesdropping rate.
The sum secrecy rate of Scheme I and the orthogonal
multiple access (OMA) scheme is compared under different Ps
andM in Fig. 5. rt = 1 bit/s/Hz and de = 300 m. In the OMA
Scheme, we adopt the time division multiple access mode and
maximize the secrecy rate of a specific legitimate user in each
time slot. From the results, we can see that the sum secrecy
rate of Scheme I is much higher than that of the OMA scheme.
Thus, the superiority of Scheme I in improving the spectrum
efficiency and security performance over the OMA scheme
can be verified.
Then, the performance of Scheme II is evaluated. The eaves-
dropping rate towards UE-2 of Scheme II and the conventional
scheme in (8) is compared with different Ps and M in Fig. 6.
rt = 1 bit/s/Hz and de = 50 m. From the results, we can notice
that the eavesdropping rate towards UE-2 of Scheme II is close
to 0, and much lower than that of Scheme in (8). Thus, we can
conclude that the proposed Scheme II can effectively guarantee
the security performance of UE-2 by hiding its signal in the
larger signal of UE-1. In addition, the number of antennas
at BS will not obviously affect the security performance in
Scheme II.
The secrecy rate of UE-2 of Scheme II is compared with
different Ps and rt in Fig. 7. M = 3 and de = 100 m.
From the results, we can see that the secrecy rate can be
guaranteed to be close to rt. This is because according to
(34), the transmit power of UE-2 is saved to disrupt the
eavesdropping by maximizing the transmit power of UE-1,
with the transmission rate of UE-2 equal to rt. Thus, the
eavesdropping towards UE-2 can be disrupted effectively, and
the secrecy rate is close to the transmission rate when Ps is
high enough.
Last, the performance of Scheme III is demonstrated. The
eavesdropping rate towards UE-1 of Scheme III and the
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conventional scheme in (8) is compared with different Ps and
M in Fig. 8. rt = 1 bit/s/Hz and de = 50 m. From the
results, we can see that the eavesdropping rate towards UE-1 of
Scheme III is close to 0, and much lower than that of Scheme
in (8). Thus, we can conclude that the proposed Scheme III
can effectively guarantee the security performance of UE-1
by hiding its signal in the larger signal of UE-2, which can
be achieved by modified SIC order via joint precoding. In
addition, we can also observe that the number of antennas at
BS will not affect the security performance in Scheme III.
We compare the secrecy rate of UE-1 of Scheme III with
different Ps and rt in Fig. 9. M = 3 and de = 300 m. From
the results, we can see that the secrecy rate can be guaranteed
to be close to rt. According to (42), the transmit power of
UE-1 is saved to disrupt the eavesdropping by maximizing
the transmit power of UE-2, with the transmission rate of UE-
1 equal to rt. This can be achieved by modified SIC order
via joint precoding. Thus, the eavesdropping towards UE-1
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can be disrupted effectively, and the secrecy rate is close to
the transmission rate when Ps is high enough. In addition,
comparing Fig. 7 and Fig. 9, we can observe that the secrecy
rate of UE-1 in Scheme III is slightly lower than the secrecy
rate of UE-2 in Scheme II. This is because the modified SIC
order in Scheme III requires more resource to achieve, and
thus higher transmit power is required at BS to achieve same
security performance in Scheme III.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, three secure transmission schemes are pro-
posed for MISO-NOMA networks via joint precoding opti-
mization, with and without eavesdropping CSI, respectively.
For the case when the eavesdropping CSI is available at
BS, the precoding vectors are jointly optimized to maximize
the sum secrecy rate. The problem is non-convex, and we
transform it into a convex one via SOC programming, which
can be solved iteratively. When the eavesdropping CSI is
unavailable, we first consider that the secure user is not the
farthest from BS, and the transmit power of the farther users is
maximized via joint precoding optimization to ensure its own
security. We then consider the case when the farthest user from
BS requires secure transmission, and the modified SIC order
and joint precoding optimization can be leveraged to guarantee
its security. Similar method to the scheme with CSI can also
be exploited to calculate the suboptimal solutions to these two
non-convex problems. Simulation results are shown to verify
the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed schemes in
enhancing the security for downlink MISO NOMA. In the
future work, we will continue to carry out the secrecy outage
probability (SOP) analysis for the proposed schemes.
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
First, to transform R[i]t  rt, we introduce a variable si,
and let
1 +
jhiwij2PK
j=i+1 jhiwj j2 + 2
 si; i = 1; 2;   ;K   1; (53a)
1 + jhKwK j2=2  sK ; (53b)
which are equal to
jhiwij2
si   1 
XK
j=i+1
jhiwj j2 + 2; i = 1; 2;   ;K   1; (54a)
jhKwK j2
sK   1  
2: (54b)
The left sides of the inequalities in (54) can be written as
 i(wi; si) =
hiwiwyih
y
i
si   1 ; i 2 K:
(55)
Then, the first order Taylor’s approximation for (55) can be
derived as
Li(wi; si;wi; si) =
2Re

wyih
y
ihiwi

si   1
 
Re

wyih
y
ihiwi

(si   1)2 (si   1); i 2 K:
(56)
Therefore, according to the SOC constraint (24), the inequal-
ities (54) can be transformed into[2hiwi+1; 2h1wi+2;    ; 2hiwK ; 2;Li   1]y  Li + 1;
i = 1; 2;    ;K   1; (57a)[2;LK   1]y  LK + 1: (57b)
With the above transformations, the lower limitation of
transmission rate R[i]t  rt can be changed into
si  2rt ; i 2 K: (58)
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Then, we consider the transformation of (7). In order to
make all the rate Rik achievable, we have
min

Rii+1; R
i
i+2; : : : ; R
i
K
	  R[i]t ; i=1;  ;K 1; (59)
which is equivalent to8>>>>><>>>>>:
Rii+1  R[i]t ;
Rii+2  R[i]t ;
: : : : : : ;
RiK 1  R[i]t ;
RiK  R[i]t :
(60)
Each of these inequalities in (60) can be transformed individ-
ually. For example, Rii+1  R[i]t can be written as
Rii+1  R[i]t  0; i = 1;    ;K   1; (61)
which is equivalent to
log2
 PK
j=i hi+1wjw
y
jh
y
i+1+
2PK
j=i+1 hi+1wjw
y
jh
y
i+1 + 
2
!
 log2
 PK
j=i hiwjw
y
jh
y
i+
2PK
j=i+1 hiwjw
y
jh
y
i + 
2
!
0; i=1;   ;K   1:
(62)
Through introducing auxiliary variables fi+1, gi+1, hi+1 and
qi+1, we can get some upper and lower bounds asXK
j=i
hi+1wjwyjh
y
i+1 + 
2  efi+1 ; i = 1;   ;K   1;(63a)
XK
j=i+1
hi+1wjwyjh
y
i+1+
2  egi+1 ; i=1;  ;K   1; (63b)
XK
j=i
hiwjwyjh
y
i + 
2  ehi+1 ; i = 1;   ;K   1; (63c)
XK
j=i+1
hiwjwyjh
y
i + 
2  eqi+1 ; i = 1;   ;K   1; (63d)
according to which, (62) can be transformed into
log2 e  (fi+1 gi+1+hi+1 qi+1)  0; i=1;  ;K   1;(64)
which can be equivalently formulated as
fi+1   gi+1 + hi+1   qi+1  0; i = 1;    ;K   1: (65)
Therefore, (59) can be transformed into the following series
of inequalities, i = 1;   ;K   1.
Oi =
8>>>><>>>>:
fi+1   gi+1 + hi+1   qi+1  0;
fi+2   gi+2 + hi+2   qi+2  0;
: : : : : : ;
fK 1   gK 1 + hK 1   qK 1  0;
fK   gK + hK   qK  0:
(66)
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